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LN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~ri'

_\ 'rE

()'F~ t~T ...~H,

Ploi;1ll_rf and

1?.~).-:;poudcnlt

)
I
I

-v~

.~ t~~~~}~ ~1.

. ---

(

( t~\RCIA~ tT 1{.~
D ci·e;u !1. t 11 t. o nr l . .4. p p P. I If1Jd.

Casn No .

fl092

)
I

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

On the :!-±th dn~- of ~-\ Llg·nst ~ 19~)S~ at approxin1ately
S:OO p.1n., LeRoy ~Toseph \~c(nPt' 1\·a~ lUlled. rl,he decedent 1vas an -tnmate at tl1e 1~tah State I)rison, and
the ho1nieide O(lf·t~rred at the Prison in the attic to
Cell I~ lock A. The kilh n g \Vas ae.eorn plis h cd hy }daek
1\Ierr] l1 ll i Y(lll b u r·gh ~ J t·~ { l{. :~.~I~ :-:;s. 7, GOG and 7~ 1 ) ~ 'I'hrre
"'-,.ere t\\-o other innu.t b_l ~ p J'( ·~(' nl. in the attic at the
t iHte of the killing:t Leonard \Yarner Bnwne, and the
appellant in this n1a tter, tT e ~~{_~ ~I. (} arcia~ J-r.
Earlier that evening, It1venhnrgh told the defendant

to go get a knife ( R. 717).

rrtu~

defendant 'vent to an-

1
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other inmate, Darrel Stark and told hint that Rivenburgh "\van ted tl~e lmife (R. ;~o~, 305, 364 and 365). ''Then
tl1e defendant returned, Rivenburgh told him to go upstairs \,~jt11 Bo\vne and stand point (serve as a lookout)
1rvhile ltivenburgh engaged in an act of I>Crv-ersion 'rith
the decedent (R. 717 and 718).
The defendant and llovlne \Vent into the attjc. a fe"\v
1nmutes prior to tlle arrival of R.1vcnburgh and the
decedent {1~. 718) ~ .A. ftc r the la t le r t \VO had entered the
attic, Itivenburgh spoke to l~o\vne to 1nake sure he and
Garcia "\Vere standing \vatch. J~owne left the defendant
by a ventilator, anrl \vPnt to cloHe a grating \\~hich
covered. the pJ ace of entry (Ft. 71 S) ~ ~;\ t tl1 is i nt5ta.Tl t a
rueknt:1 started ( Il. "718 ) . 'There 'vas lHJllcring and kicking!t
and a great deal of noise ( ll. 719) ~ Because of fear~
de i'endant ran to help l1.ivenburgh pro teet 1l1Ht8elf {1t
412 and 413). 11he defendant v,;ras kicked 1Jy ~oTncone~
He believed it 'vaH the decedent (R-r 719). The defendant
tried to '"'"get~' the decedent and grabbed l1is leg~ (It
383 and 719). There "-as Ht,visting and turning all over
the placeH (R. 719). Rivenburgh lost his lrnife and asked
for help to find it. The defendant let go of decedenf~
h"\~~!t and in the dark attic, attempted to find the lost
knife (R~ 719). Defendant felt so1uething \Yet and sticky,
and \Vns very rnuch afraid (R. 719). Rivenburgh said,
,;;Let's split'' (I=t . 7~0 ), and the defendant follo"\ved hi1n
out of the attic.
~4 fter

leaving tl1e attic, the three ''Ti th the help of
other inntah~s disposed of tl1e bloody clothing and established alibis ( R.. 409 and 720). Sometime later, the
2
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defendant eorJcluded that the decedent had been killed
( lt 7~1) ..\t no tin1e did the dl~fendant hit the decedent
'vith either his fists or a knife ( [{. 719 and 720). At no
ti1ne did the defendant take part in any plan to kill
the dceedent or e1dertain any intent to kill (lt aS;},
410 and. 7~ 1.)4 ~PJ1e derendant first learned of Rivellburgh'.s intent to kill tlHJ d(.~cedent and of the actual
killing \V hile alibis \V(L re being di~z~us~cd aft e·r the k il! in.~'.
rl,h1s ~~a~ "~hen Rivenburgh, Dalton~ Stark~ and the defendant 'vere 11la~~ing cards just before check-in ti1nc
(9 :00 p.1n.) ( 1L :318 fliJO ~);_~5). The defendant 1va.s pre~c~!l t
during ~uh~Pq uent C()nversations 'vherein R-ivenburg~ ~~s
intent nnd net~ \\.Cl't~ diseu~s0.d (l{. :~lS, :~-t0, 3~0~ 37~:37 7, 408 and 409), but at no tIn u: before the killing did
l1e kno~~ that Rivenburgh jntcnded to kill the rlerP.denL
On the contra r~-, defendant thougl1t ht~ \VU:;; going to
t}l P attic to stand point for an act of so durn y {R. 340,
380, 381, 397, 4GO, 4G1, 47 8, 717 and 718).
Tesi.!nlony 'va~ introduced coneerning a conversa~
tion bet \\'Cen l{ lven h1 Lrgh and an other in1na te~ Itandel,
'dtich took place on the ~-+tlL of August prior to the
hornieide . The drugged condition of the doc.cdcnt 'vas
discus~ed~ The dect,l{}ent, as \Vell as other inmates invol\·cd, including the ''itnes~es for the state, had taken
rxee~~ive amounts of amphetin1ine pills over a perind
of days prior to the homieide. During this conver·sation,
Rivenburgh re1narked that solt~ebod~y 'vas going to cut
off the der.edenr'~ head if he continued to act as he had.
This led Rivenburgh and Randel to a general discussion
of various method~ of homicide. Such talk \vas eornmonplace at the prison. Rivenburgh had threatened to
3
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kill others on many occasions \\·ithout doing so (R. 4-tS
and 4-;J.t-) ~ _._4._ t the tune of t1 ~ i ~ (' nnversati on, the defendant
\\·a~ not pre~enL He and another intnate, Dripps, ·w·ere
in another cell ( R. 4.:20 and -1--1-7), and n ejther of then1
heard the eonversation.
Indulging i11 aruphet.i•n lnes and other drugs, pos~est:Jing knifes, threatening deattl~ and engahring in acts
of sodorny "\Vcre not unusual attivi tie~ for inrnates of
the Utah State Pris011 at thj~ tin1c -- espf.~(~ia11y R·iYen~
burgh. It "\Vas a common practiee for in1nates to .~tand
point for eae.h other ( R. ;~SH-:~ss).

rJ:hc defendant \Vas convicted of murder in the first
rlegrcc. ~rhe detailed te~ti1nony introduced supports all
of the~~ fact~. \~l e \vill refer to tl](_~ details of the testilnony as they bceoua~ applicable in stating our argurncnts .

POINT I.
DEFE)JDANT \\,.AS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BEFORE
AN r:rvTPARTI AL JURY IN TlLA.'f 1,11E TRIAL JL""DGE II\f-

r'ROPERLY COM:\-f1TKICATED 'VITII A JUROR..
POINT II.

DE:F'ENDANT \;tlAS l)L)TIED DUE PROCESS OF LA"\V
IN V'"IOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE l~NITED
STA:TES~ AME~D. XIV A~D TII~ CONSTITCTION OF
C~i' A li ~ ART+ I:r '§,12 r ):]" THA 1, I IE \VAS D E~IED HIS RIGHT
TO BE PRESENT AT ALL S'TAGES IN THE PROCEEDINGS.
POINT III.
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL I~ THAT
THE TRIAL JUDGE RECI::::IVED AN 11\fPROPER Qt;ESTION
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FROl\f A JUROR AND TRANSI\'IITTED THIS IMPROPER
TO COUNSEL.

(~UESTION

POINT IV+
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTI~G DEFE~DANT~S ~lOTION TO DIS:\IISS AND DEFENDA~TrS
:.TOTIO~ FOR A DIRECTED ·vERDI.CT SINCE THE JURY
COlTLD NOT HAVE FOUND BE.YOKD A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT TilE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF
n.fCRDER+

POINT V.
THE

TRL~L

DEFEKDA~·T'S

COURT ERRED TN REFUSING TO GIVE
REQUESTED INSTRuCTION NO~ 43.
POINT ,ri.

THE rrRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO+ 20 IS CONFUSING AND IN ERROR BECAUSE IT FAILS TO SEPAR-

ATE THE CRIME OF SODOMY FROM THE CRIME OF
J\.fURDER. AND l)J" I'TS ABS~rRA·CT FORM COULD ALLOW
THE JURY TO ~,IND TilE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF 1\-IUR-DER IF THEY BELIEVED HE AIDED AND ABETTED IN

THE ACT OF SODOI\IY.
POINT VII.
THE TRIAL CO.L,TRT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 17..

POINT VIII..
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSTI\'G TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S REQGESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO. 19 AND
NO~ 2L

POINT IX.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
DEFENDANT·s REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 20+
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POIN·T Xr

TilL TRIAL COURT ERRED r:-f FAILING TO CQ}fPEL
THE PROSECUTION TO FURXISH TAPE RECORDINGS
A~D COPIES OF STATETh-IENTS 1\'IADE BY WITNESSES

A)ID 'rilE

DEFENDANT~

POINT XT.

THE rrRIAL CO"CRT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
A 1\'"E\V TRIAL.

POINT XII.

TilE TRlA.L COURT f~RRED IN D8~YlNG DEFEND~
ANT'S J\fOTION TO STRIKE TESTI1fONY WHICH WAS
AD1IIT'rED ON THE STATE!>S REPRESE~T~I\.!TION THAT
IT WOULD SHOW A CONSPIRACY TO CQMI\'IIT MURDER.
POINT XIII.
THE TRIAL COl~RT ERit~D IN SUBI\1ITTI~G THE
CASE TO THE J"LRY ON 'THE QUESTION OF 1\fURDER
IN THE FIRST DEGREE SINCE AS A MATTER OF LAW~
DEFEKDANT'S ]riENTAL CONDITION Plt.EVENTED HII\1
FROM PREl\l~DlTATING OR DELIBERA1~ING.

ARG·Cl\lBNT
POINT L
DEFE~DANT \V~.\S

DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BEFORE

}1~

Il\oiPARTIAL JURY IN THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE IJIPROPERLY COJL.\lUl\'IC...:\.T~D WITH A Jl~ROR.

On lhP la~t. day of the t1·ial~ the trial judge requested
coun ~el to 1neet '\Y1th hin1 in chan1bers~ 1-I c~ then related
a <~onvPrsation 'vhicl1 had taken place het,11.recn himself
and one of the jurors~ ~rhe trial judge stated as f ollov.rs:
'•rl h1~ 1110 rning
1

about 8 :30, a juror by the
narne of Armstrong, asked n1e, as I arrived at
6
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the Courthouse~ if he eould ask me a
and I told hi1n ,. Yes.~~

question~

'~

i IP caine into (~harnbers, and he asked if
the parties vlere going to introduce the tapes of
the conversation bet\veen the t\vo defpndnnl s.

"I told him I did not kno\v~ I 'vould tell counsel that he had asked and leave it up to counseL.
'~ ll P

ah;o said that he "\\ as ansiou8 LsI e] to
knov,r, it '\'as i1nportant~ because he could not f!'CL
an ans,ver to a question in his mind, as to \\·ho
did the stabbing.
7

~~He

said there vva8 evidence that Garcia had
the knife in the attic, in his hand, and that later
on, another person had the knife, and he did not
kno\v 'vho did the stabbing.
"I told h1 rn that l \v·ould r.·ela~.e hi~ q ucsl ions
to coun~el, and leave it up to c.onnsel to either
atte1npt to re-open their case and pnt in more
evidence to clarify or takP r..are of the matter on
argument.'~ (R. 855 and 856) .
This ar.tion on the part of the trial judge 'vas irnproper,
prejudicial, and certainl_,. const i t.u10.s a re,Tersihle errot·.
See State Y. (_~rank~ 105 Utah 332, 1..1-~ P~2d 178 ( 1948) ;
State v~ Anderson,. 65 l~tah +h\ ~37 .Pac. D-~1 ( 1925);

State v . Thornet 9G

l~tah

208, 117 Pac. 58 (1911).

The ~tatutt\s of this 8tate are explicit in regard to
cornn1unication "\Yith the jury. The officer in charge of
the jury must be sworn, ~~ .... to suffer no person to
speak to them or communicate v,;rj_th them, nor to do HO
himself, on any subject connected ~ith the trial, .... '"
Utah Code .linn. §77 -31~27 ( 1953).

7
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rrhe court lnust adtnoni~h the jul'y at each aajournment, " . . . tl1at it is their duty not to eonvL·r~(~ among
i..hen1~elves -uvr -~tith (Ul:JJone else on any suhjeet conneeted \Vi th the trial~ . . .~~ T~ tah l ~ou c l~. nnr ~ 7 7-31-28
( 1953) (Etnphasis Hdded.).
It is elementary that connnnni~at.ion 1vith t.he jury
must be p1~cvcutcd if the defendanl is to have a fair
triaL .A.rticle 1, -~ 1~ of the Utah (_~onstitution guarantee~
tlt e def en dan t a trial by an impartial jury. Certainly
tl1 is irn partiality cannot be inH u red if improper comnntnication o,vitlt the jury is allo\\red. See State v~ . .-\nde t•:-jon~ C·3 T~ tall 415, ~37 Pac. 941 ( 19:2;~)). rrhe faet tltn t.
the conununieant "\VH~ the judge dot~~ not n_\JnPdy the
(:rroe . To the contrary, tlu: official office of the judge
rnake~ the co1nrnun ieat.ion all 1 he n1or·c prejudh~ial, for
the infonnation tlJe juror rr1ight ga1n.t .intentionally or
indavertantly, Vt'ould carr.v Hllt(·h greater force. Tl1e
court in Sargent 'r· Robert~~ 1 Pick. (Ma~s.) 337 ~ 11 An1.
Dec. 185 ( 13.:23), stated as follow:.;:
'~It i.:-;.

not sufficient to stty that U1i~ po1ver i~
in hands highly respont5)1Jle for the proper exerei:-;e of it: the only sure \vay to prevent all ,jealousie8 and ~us pieiun s i ~ 1.o eonsider the judge as
having no control \vhatever over the ea~e . cxr.Ppt
in open court, in prP~Pnce of the part 1c~ and
their cormsel. The public interest requires that
litiga.t.in~ part1e~ ~l1ould have nothing to complain
of or suf;per.t in the admini~tration of justice,
and tlte convenience of juror~ i~ of small congiderat1on {~.ornpared "\Yith this great object''

The juror rrlu8t be carefuJ to hold himself above
suspicion~ In State v. Andel'son~ 6.J l:tah 415, :237 Pac .
8
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~)-I: 1

( 1~ l~:~)), it appeared that the prosecuting \\'i tnes s
had given u juror a ride to an~l fnnn the ronrt (•YPry(lny
or the trial. The (_T tah court 8tated as foll ("l\\~S:
it should nlso be remembered

that~

\v-hcn
a juror 1~ sehlcted h~r reason of his i1npartiality
til detenu inP not only the property rigllb:; hf'1\\·Pen individuals, but in criminal eases the per~~~ Jnal lihert~· of individuals charged 'vith offenses,
t.hP. law requires of the ,juror such conduct during
that ti1ne that his verdict rnay be above snspirion
~ls to its having been ini'lur~need h~r any eonduct
on his part during the trial. .. /'
H .....

In ~tate v. 'l'hoTnet 96 lftah 208, 117 Pac. 58 {1911.),
a juror tnl ked to ~o1neone over the telephone~ 1t \r ns
held that tl1i~ un~xplained communication amounted to
mi!5conduct. The 1:t.nh court in so holding stated as
follo,vs:
~~To

obtain the free and d i~ pn.~ f:d onn.l e j ndgInent of jurors in the trial of capital cases, long
expericne<._. ln1~ dcn1onRtrated tllf~ nece8sity of preventing the jury from mingling or conversing
\\' 1th the peoplP, and of keeping them secluded
fro1n all outside influences calculated to interfere \Vith or affect their impartiality or .judginent~
These ~afegnards ""iere at cornrnon la"\v deemed
essential to the right itself of trial by jury. That
right ''""~th it~ aneient safeguard~ ha.s been pref·a~rvcd i Il thi ~ eonn try hy (~onstl tutions and ~tat
ntPs. An infraction of It caieulated to itnpair th~
right cannot properly rerr1ve the sanction of tl1e
court "\vithout. doing violence to su('.h constitu~
tiona! and statutory provisions. If it should be
thought that they no longer serve a useful pur~
pose, let then1 be abolished and taken out of the
Constitution and statute and others substituted
in their place. As long as they remain~ it is the

9
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duty of the ('Ourt~ to sr~e that they are observed

and obeyed."
1'1lis Cou t't ha.s dealt ,r·itl1 tl1e problem of connnunirat.ion Vlith the jury on othPl' occasion~~ Tn State v~
Crank~ .1 05 l itah :t~2, 14:2 P ..:!s 178 ( 1943 L a juror conversed \Vi th the prosecuting \VltllCS~. rllhi~ \\'aS ~a]d to
lle improper even thougl1 the cornmunieation \Vas 1nercly

fo1· the purpose of retH~,\·ing an old friendship . The
Court stated tbat, "[i]n such instance::;~ the VPrrliet or
the jury, like CneHar'~ "\\~ife, ~n-ast be abot-e ,·nlspiciull~~'
Otl~er

ju1isdictio n~ have con.sidere d the question
of (·ouununieation \vith the jury~ and the general rule
holds sueh improper acti vi.ty to be reversible~ ln Doles
v. State, 97 Jnri. 555 (1SS--+ ), tl1e UlH~xplained presence of
tho bailiff in the ju1·y roont requi r·ed a ne'v triaL In
T) eo p 1e v. C11an1 be1·s,
· .~)-g
""\.~
-r-:6 ( 1°3~)
.c
. . { h;\f 1· e·1L 73 , '~l.-:--1
t
~, •'\r· ~ tl:D
t' ' ,
a ne\V trial \1-·as ordcrr~d even thnugh the bailiff c\ntererl
tl1e jury room at. the req1H'St of the jnry to provide
tohaeco and 1~;-aterr lt Is ('lear that any disr.ussion of
the cas P. b~y- t..h e bailiff in r,ha r ge of the jury 1\rith the
jurors 'vill entitle the defendant to a nevl triaL S-ee
Taylor v. State, 18 Ala~ ...-\.pp. +Gti, 93 So. 78 ( 19~~-);
Peo plt~ v. ICa 'voleRld, 313 Ill. 2~) 7, 1-t:i X~E. 203 ( 19:!-l) ;
l~rarnlett v. State~ 129 N P.h~ 1 SO~ ~nt ::\.'\Y·. 166 (1935).

There are many cases in vnlving r.o1nnnrnirat.ion 1vith
the jury by the judge~ In State v. ~Iurphy, 17 N.D. 4S~
115 N. ''r~ S-+ ( lDOS) t the eon duct of the judge in di8euss~
ing the case \Vith the jnry in the jury room after their
retirement for deliberation 'vas held prejudicial error,
rega.rdlcs~ ol' ·w·hetJ1er the partic.ular conversati011 jn10
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fluenced their dp(·i~ion. In the recent TTtah <'HKf\ Johnson
,~. :\1 a y nard. ~ l r I ah 2d ~~ ;~, ~~-t~, P .:.!( l 884 (1959) ~ the
trial judge entprcd the~ ju r·y roon~ to ans"\ver a que;--;tion.
This \,·as done in the absence or and w·i thout the consent
or COUnsel, ~\ J'tpr the incident the trial _j udg-~~ advi;:.;ed
coun~Pl nnd for the record n1ade a general state1nen t
of 1vhat \\·n~ donP~
T~hc

l; tah court held the conduct of the judge to
be i1nprtqH~r e\'Pil though there '\\·as no (l uestlon of his
good in ten ti on H. Si Tn i lar activity· '\\ a~ 1u_~ ld to be prPjn~
dicial P tTor in t~,erdcrer Y. I\ orthern PaeiJ'i(~ 1{:-·., 7;)
I\ rD . 13 9, 2G N". \\~.. 2d ~: ~ G (1.9-1:7 ) . ~ e e also State v. \\' n l t e,
1:3~) \\'a~ h. G7 ~ ~:):-{ P~H~~ 617 ( 1~J~~-l) ( atte1npteu ru l) 1~~ •J••\·) ;
0 )
r l.
~· Okl a. C r1n1.. R e P~ 19.::)
. ~.1
B ennet t v. Sita tt~~ ~·)~l . . I:) nt~. ')(J()
(a~ ~a ul t to do hod i 1y harrn) ; \ r a caster v. 8ta t e~ 17:2
.i\rk. ~~~;~~ ~Ul S. \Y-. SCl (10~7) (1nurder ~ judge talked t.n
foreman in hall outside of jury room; eonvittion reversed even though Ye1·diet had already been ngreerl
upon); State v . .Jlattltt\\·s~ 191 ~.(~. 37S, 131 t;,R~ 74:~
( lH:!ti) (murder) : Sl!il·ld::J v~ l Tni ted States, ~73 lJ.S~ 5S~~~
( 1D.:!7) ( eonspiru ~;7 to viola tc~ prohibi ton act) ; ''Ti11iarn s
v. ( onlmon"\vealth, .:207 1\ y. S07 ~ ~70 S~ '\7".. Gl ( 1[}~;))
(selling intoxicating liquor) .
7

1

t •

•

1

The only sure \Yay to prL·vc1•t ~l~spicions of unfairnPs~ and pn:.;sihle impair1nent of eonfidence in the intPg-r i i y of the r·o ll rt. is to con~ider t 11 e j udgc n ~ having
no eontrol over· the case except in open court in the
presence of counsel and the parties. See Sargent v.
R-ohert~, 1 Pick.. ( ~~ af.;s.) :~;;7 J 11 . A.m. Dec. 185 ( 18:?3).
All questions of the jury should be considered here 1 and

11
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if an ans \VCr can properly be given, it should be given
here . The public intere~t requires that litigating parties should hav,_~ nothing to con1plain of or ~uspect in
tho adu1inistration of justice. (~ertainly thi~ int.ere~t
is greatl~r w1lcn the ea~e it5 a cri1ninal one and the crime
i~ punishable h y de a lh. The 1naintC11ance of high idea1s
in this respect stems fro1n con~f·iousness on the part
of U1osc ,,..·ho participate in 1rials that proceedings are
open to the publjc.
In State v . ~Iurphy, 17
the court stated as follo\vs:

N~D4

-±S, 115

X~t~l.

84

(1908)~

to the pu rit.Y of the in t.ent1 ons of the
judge in going .Jnt.o the jury room in this case,
~~ ,.;\,.-.;

and there having the brief communication "With
the jury~ no certificate or proof is necessary so
far as this court is concer-ned, as it 'vell knows
that his uprightnc8s and ~incere desire to be abS<~lutely ,ju~t and fajr in all cases are beyond
q nestionL tllhat admitted fact, ho-\vever, doe~ not
meet the question before us, \\~hich 1s: JJld he
do tl1at \vhich \Yas beyond hi~ judicial functions
in rP~ p(~(~!: to tile easc-1 \Ve are forced to the conclusion that he he did . IIis presence in the jury
roorn for any kind of eommunication \vith the
jury is not conte1nplated b~- auy provision of the
sta.tute4 Tl1e opposite is the plain interference
from the Rta.tu te. .All corn I nunica tion to the jury
in open court i ~ subject to exception by the partie~, if deemed ilnproper. If any co1nmunication
is n1ade to them in the j11ry room in the absence
of the parties, no opportuni t.\· is afforded for
objections and exceptions at the tizne4 The open
court i~ tlu~ place for co1nmunications to the jury
in the presence of, or on no tire to the attorneys.
The jury room is for the jury alone, and no torn-
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rnuni(·ati on~ n re nl1o,ved ,.,rith then1 i11 the room
exrE ~ p ~ l Lpon o rdP rH frotn the court through the
officer in (' ha rge of them~ v,cho is penni tted to
ask them \vhether they have agreed upon a verdict. .:\11 co1nrnunications to the jury In referenee
to the case should be made in open court, and
all colnlnunic.ation~ to them in the jury roorn
avoided. In this 'vay· all distrust and fear that
~olnPt h illg i1nproper i~ said or done "·ill be ·without foundation~ and every act be subjcet to exception and r<._~vie\v ...ATJ.V corrnnunication by V{ord
or ''" ~·iti11~~ r1ot )n open <·on r-t affp(·t H the ef,.ieienr~~
of jur)' tl'lals as a 1neans of accomplishing justice
after g[Yin~; all parties full opportunity of being
hPard at all stages of the triaL A str1f~t (•onlpliance V~-"ith this practice of having all proceedings in court in the presence of counsel, or on
notite to thenl~ unle~H ,,·ai ved, i~ better than to
eount.enance violat.lou~ thereof unlP~~ prPjndice is
shO\\·n. ~ .. \Ve think that any communication in
this "~ay as to thP case should l1e prohibited and
held prejudicial It is against the policy of the
la\v to indulge in secret comrrtunications or conferences \vitlJ the jury or 'vith jurors jn refer~
enee to the lncritf.! or la'v of the rase. To determine
in each case \Yhether prejudice resulted would
be difficult, if not impossible, and justice 'viii
be better served by avoiding such communications entirely. The authol·itiL~s are practically
unani.Inou~ in condemning- such comtnnnication~t
and in holding them prejndiejal as a 1natter of
law.''
See also State v. "\r roth, 15 \\'ash. 621 , ..t 7 P a e. 10 6 ( 18 96).

The comntnnieation in the Jl-urphy case took place
in the jury roorn, \YhiJe as in the instant easP the communication \\·as )n the judge~s charnbcrs. This distinction
makes little difference indeed. 1,he conversation be-
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t\veen the judge and the juror \vas a se<"·ret conve n:;ati on. 'fhe defeudan t 'Ya~ not gi\Ten notice, and v.,ras
afforded no opporiunl t~v to be present lie had no ehance
to objctt to the questions or the ans"\vers, and is not
even sure or what was said or the nnpaet that it rnay
l1ave had on this jury.
'The defenda11t haf.; no burden of sho\ving that the
communication \Vas prejudicial to his caRe or that the
content of the conversation involved prejudicial matters
or pertained to the ca~e. One reason for thi~ rille V{as
~tated in Sta-te v. Jlur1;h.y, :supra. ~argent v~ Roberts,
1 Piek~ ( Ma:.-:;~~) 337, 11 AnL Dec~ 180 (1823), also put
forth ttl is n_.a~on and in t:10 uo1n~; stated:
~ . As

it is in1pos~ible, "\Ve think, to complain
of the ::Jub8tanee of the eornruunieation, tlJe- only
que~tlon is 'vhether an:y eort1rnunicat i un at all is
p1·oper; and, if 11 wa~ not, the party a.galn~t whon1
the verdi ei \vas is en ti tied to a ne1v- triaL,'
See also Fina
1931) ~

~l~

llnited States, 4G

F+~d

643 (10th Cir.

ln State v~ Thorne~ B6 T_;ta 11 ~US~ 117 Pac. 58 (1911)
the state offered no evideneP. lo di~pu te the defendant,
and did not atte1npt to ~ho"\v that the ronHnunication 'va8
harrnlcs~r r:rhe state argue(] that prPjudic.e tnnld not
be presumed fro1n an unexp1aincd communication. It
\\Tas their po~ition that the defendant 1vas required to
sho\v that harJnful intorn~ation ·wa~ con1municated to
the jnror and that this infor1nation tended to influence
h.i.s deliberations and verdict, and until such was shO\Yll,
the state 'vas not re( uircd to sho\v the contrary
1

4
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The

l~tah

court stated

a~

follo·w·s:

~·rt_,hat

rule n1igl1t \vell be applied to romlHLilti<"~-n 1ions het \\·een a juror aTHi n person hav1ng
no int{~r·est jn tl1e litigation~ v.,r"hich \\·er·e authori~.~~d and rHd f'o t·bidderL lt Jrla_\" hP p t'(~RlllllPd t.ha j
a jul'o r, \\·ho pPnding- thp trial, 0 t· n f't.er the retil'PtllPnt OI' the jur~- to (·onHidCt' of th<\ir V(•fOi(·jt
rul( 1 not forh1dden to do sol ron1mnnicates \vith
one~ a ~ trange r ~ (l., and not in~ r. rP~ tP.rl j n the li 1ig·a tiont co1n1nnn ieated about son1ething not re~

lated to the case or the parties. _._~n unexplained
communieation under such circu1nstances 1vould
not an1onnt to misconduct, unless the circum~ t u n(·e~ attending it "~e rp s nth as to ind u~e an
infe r(lnee of ~ou1e w·rong-ful or j 1n proper condtH~L
Tn suf~ h en ~e a pre~ u n Lpj ron o i" prej ndic.e shon ld
not be indltlged from an unexplained communication even though fro1n the attending circumstances it 1nay be said that the conduct \vith
rcspeet to it \Ya:-; of dou1Jtful pl'Opriet~~~ But here
the (~onunun !cation had, under the circ~urnstances
disclosed, \rn~ unauthorized and forbidden . If it
\Vas neeessary for the juror to communicate "\vith
someone over the telephone or other,vise, the
Inatter should l1avc h(l<.\n ea1lcd to tl1e at.tention
of the (!OU rt "~ho could haYe grant~d or refused
the perTni~~[on as t.hP ex lgenries or the ra~e required. rro hold f.;UCh private communications,
under the circumstance~, a part fro1n and in the
absence of his fellu\v jurors, and "\vithout the
court ~s perm.i8sion, certainly 1,~a~ miscond u c.t .
8ueh conduct cannot be tolerated and thP. purity
of tl1e jurr rnaintained. To permit it and to
e-xcuse it as to one juror requires a permi~sion
of it to others~ rpo do that l~ to allow members
of the jury t.o he brought in contact with outsiderst and to afford them an opportunity to
hold prejudicial communications ahont the case~
or at least to expose them to such harmful and
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prejudicial influences.. rl,he juror here by hi::;
mi~conrl uet expo sed himself to such influences~
\"\That the juror said over the teJ<..-.phone, or \vhat
\vas Haid to 111 n1~ i~ not n1adc ~ o appear. Had
his eond uet in sueh partleu lar not lJecu nl i sconduet~ perhap~ the pre~urnption might be indulged
that. \vhat \vas f;aid by hi1n or eo1nmrmicated to
hirn "\Vas entirely per~onal to him and unrelated
to the ease until tlH~ contrary ,\-u~ 1uade to appear.
llut he did something 'vl1i{!l1 he ,\·as unauthorized
and forbidd(~n to ~lo. He "\Vas a contemnor and
a "\Vrongdoes. ~,rom the misconduct d.is closed and
tl1e exposure of the juror to harmful influence,.
prejudiec 1~ pre~urncil, and the burden cast on
the state to sho-\V what the communication was,.
and that it \Vas harmless and could not have in~
f]nenced or affected t1le deliberation of the juror
or his verdict.

4

••

~~ ...

To say that the accused cannot sustain
his claim of prejudice until he al~o sho\\ 6 that
the juror talked about ~OJnething harmful to
the accused's rjghis is to fritter away the cons tit Lttional and stat utor~y- provisions requiring
7

the jury to be kept secluded from all outside
influence8. '~
Cf~rl

a[nly the judge cannot be considered a . ~~trang

e r'' to the ca~e. ~l,he uta tters \\ h 1ch \Vere di1-3-eussed involved both the lavl and the 1nerits o~}1e ~a~c.-.. The
content of the conversation \Vas prejudicial (_\ven as
related by the judge to counsel at a later tirnc. Of
course the judge 'vas not purporting to d i sel ose every
single 'vord that \vas spoken. Other significant thoughts
could 1lave a11d prohallly did pass to the juror4 The
defendant is certainly in no position to come forVtTUrd
'rith the content of the conver~ation for he \Vas not
7
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present ~l'he communication "\vas not proper. In light
Uu~ statutes and the very instrnet I on~ and admonitions
\Vhich the judge had de1lvei'Pd to the jurors, the judge
and this juror \vCIIe guilty· of 1n i~cond uet in so r.onver~ i ng. Sec ~argent vI Robert~, 1 Pick.. (~lass . ) 337, 11
AnL Dee. 18C, (1823)+ If the misconduct in State v~
Thorne "'~as deemed sufficient to justify a ne"\v trialt
then the activity in the instant ease 1.vould certainly
\\.,..arrant such an order.

or

~l,he trinl

judge and the juror in question are both
guilty of rni8eor1duct '\rhat \Ve krlo\\- of the content or
their eonversafion ru<ll(~ates that they diHtUH~cd the
en~e as to its rnerrits and also as to the la\v~ On tlu~
face of things prejudice is sho\vn~ Certainly if front
\vl1at the judge ~a"~ fit to place in the Record, there
is no prejudice, the defendant should not be made to
shoY{ prejudice in ,,~lntt \YU~ said but not recorded. Because of the very circmnstances of this incident~ prejudice
should be presumed. The irn}Jroper action of the trial
judge in discu~sing the case alone in his chambers
\~rith a juror is sufficient to raise rnany ~u~picions. If
our jury system is to n1aintain itself, if it is to b.a
regarded as the best \vay at hand to achieve justice,
then thi~ court must make sure that no activity is
allo~7 ed which would create suspicions of unfairness.
The test ,,~as set forth in State v. Anderson, 65 Utah
41~? 237 Pac. 941 ( 19.25) ~ as follo,vs:

"I . I can it be said that appellant had the
full benefit of trial by an impartial jury and
one in no way influenced except by the evidence
and the instructions of the court relative to the
law applicable to the facts in the ease?"
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The aetion of the trial judge in di~cussing the ease
1vith a juror J:-3 prejudicialr The defendant j ::J entitled
to a ne"\v trial before a fair and hnparlial jury~
POINT II.
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LA\V
II'\ VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, A:\-IE~D. XI"V AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
L'TAH, ART+ I, §12 IN THAT HE \~rAS DENIED HIS RIGHT
TO BE PRESENT AT ALL S"TAGES IN Tllo PROCEEDINGSr

In connection vlith the cominunieation lJet\vl·en the
trial judge and a juror \Vhich Vt'as dc~cribcd in the
argument to Point I (page 6), the defendant 'vas
denied his right ~ o be presP.nt at all stages of the pro~
ceedings. It i~ elementary ihat in a felony there can
be no trial on the merits in the absence of the defendant
See State v. Aikers, 87 L~tah 507, 51 P~2d 10;)~- ( 193~);
Hopt v. People of L1 tah, 110 t.r~s. 57-1- (1883)4
The right of the defendant t.o be present ste1ns from
The Constitution of Utah, art l, ~ 1:1. ~'he ~tatutes of
this state a l ~o require the presence of the defendant
"-'
J
A Tlll • .:;;.~
. ~ ...t ~~-1 S ,.....""'
!' .,., ·) ~ ~ ·r~ .
r:~ 33 2
f:)ee {T~ ta l t C·Ot,e
II-~~--~ 4. ~ - - i -.), ~ '- ~
I

j

-l

77-35-3 ( 1953)

,

I

In State vi _._;\.ikers_t S7 l~t.ah ;>U7, ;)1 P . 2d 1052 (193:) ),
the l J"tah court stated as follo\VS :

hThe re is no douht hut t l1 at the eon sti tu tional
right to appear and defend in person and by
eonnsel i ~ a sacred right of one accused of crime
whid1 111ay not ln. infringe~(] or frittered a \\·ny,
and is one "\\'hich 1nay not be denied lJ,T a (\ou rt.
or 1~t~ 'vaivPd hy ('ounscl. ... ·\Yhcther ~uch right
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rnay h(.~ \\"fli vp(l by t hP rlefendant pc·r~onall.\' 1-~ a

(] tu:...~t iOll on \Y~1Itl1 the authorities ar{_\ divided ....
T,he d\.\ti~lon~ tur-n on l l1P question of "~hetl1er the
uefendl.nlt '\'H~ voluntariJy absent at suell time.
In s U(~h (•a.~t~~ it i::; generalJy held that the defendant eannot hy hi;-.; voluntary act invnljdat (~
the proceeding~ . [ PnSP~ eited]

"It is one thing for hi u1 to absent himself
,,. hen he is at libertv a r1 (l c~nn vol nn taril v do :so~.
~

~

and quite another thing for the court to deprive
hin1 of any subHtnutial rlg·ht aginst his protest
or even ,y}Jen, in sorne r.ircnmstane.es~ he rentains
silent. '\:here a defendant is in custody, and
thcr:cfore not a free agent, the duty is on tl1c
court to sec that he is personall~y· present at every
~tagc of the trial. .... Proceeclings had in the
absence of a defendant, ·without his fault and
'"rithout his kno,vledge or con~ent, is ground for
reversaL'~

''Thile the particular facts of f:1tatr.. r. A·ikcrs required
a derision that. there had been no denial of constitutional
rights, the dictim eited above iR an jndication of. the
feeling of the court and the great i1nportance of the
require1nent that the defrndan t he prPsenl at all stages
in the proceeding~.
In Hopt v. People of lTtah, 110 ·L:.s. 5·74 (lBSB),
the defendant challenged six jurors for bias. The s ta1u t.eprovided that a juror be triPd by threP impartial triers.
The six jurors "\vere tried out of the prP.senr..e of the
defendant and the bias '\Va~ found to he not true. rJ:he
question presented to the court \\~as whether or not
thi~ proceeding V'""as part of the trial. The Supreme
Court of tl1e "'L~nitPd States held that it 'vas. In so
doing they stated as follo"'~s:
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''I .. the Legislature has deemed it essential
to the protP(~tion of one -.,vhose life or liberty
i8 involved in a prosecution for felony, that he
shall be personally present at the trial, that i~,
at every stage of the tt·ial \vhen hif.; substantial
rights Ina y be af rec.ted by the proceedings against
hin1.. If he be deprived of his life or liberty v.rithout being so present, such deprivation \vnuld be
v,..~ithout that due process or law required by the

Constitution.''
The conversation br~tween the judge and the juror
in the instant case 'vas part of the proceedings. 1t 'vas
held during the course of the trial. It took plaee in the
judges charnbers. It concerned the merits and the lavl
of the case . Indeed, it affected the .subt5tantial rights
of the defendant. The defendant had a right to be
present \vhen the conven-5ation occurred . It is true that
in State v~ Mortensen, 26 Utah 31 ~, 73 Pac. 562 (1903 ),
the T; tah con rt held. tl.1at the v..Tord '~triaF as used in
the con~titution and statutes \va.:, limited to the proceedings conducted in the place \vhere the court wa~
held, and thi~ did not include a vie\\~. llowever in that
case the defendant kne'v full well of the view and declined to go. In the instant case, the proceeding diu
take pI ace in the c.o urt house,. and the defend ant "\Vas
given no notice of it. The defendant 'vas in the custody
of the court and yet no effort 1vas made to have him
present. .As the l!tah court stated in . Aikers, the trial
court had a duty to see that the defendant ''Ta~ present.
Sec also State v . Jiorris~ 58 Or. 397, 114 Pac. 47G (1911);
Diaz v~ lJ ni ted Sta t.e:;~ ~:28 U IS. 4-1-:2 ( 1911).
1

Not only did tl1e court have a dut.v to have the
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defendant present, the right that defendant had to be
present was one \vhieh could not be v.raived. In ~tate
v. ~lannion, 19 Utah 505, G7 Pac. 542 ( 1899), the court
held that that \vhieh the la"\\.'" required and made essential
on trial (•ould not be dispensed ~ith, either by consent
of the defendant or by his failure to object to unauthorized methods pursued by those in authority....:\ defendant charged with a felon~y c.annot 'vaive his right
to be personally present at trjal. See also State v. )1atthe,vs, 191 N.C. 378, 131 S.Et 743 ( 1926).
That communir.ation between the judge and jury is
properly considered part of the proceedings is ill us~
trated by the many cases involving further instructions
to the jury after they have retired.

See State v. Duvel,. 4 N.J·. A"l isc. 1{. 719,. 134 .A.tl. 2Ka,
af f'd, 103 ~ .J .L.. 715, 137 A tl. 718, (] 9~7) (instructions
by telephone); State v. \V-eissman, 5 N.J. I\f isc. R.. 625,
137 AtL 718 (1027); JTerderer v. ·Nothern Pacific Ry.,
75 N . D. 139, 26 )J".\:t{.2d 236 (1.947); State v. ~. ] urphy,
17 X . D. 48, 115 N.,V. 84 ( 1908); State v. "\Vroth, 1.5
"\Vash. 621, 47 Pac.. 106 (1896) .
In State v. ,~~l oolsey, 191Jtah 486, S'l Pac. 426 (1899),
the court indicated that it "\\'as not necessary that the
defendant charged with felony~ be present at filing and
trial of motions and pleas not involving question of his
guilt or innoc.ence on the merits . The activity complained
of in the instant case did go to the merits of the defendants guilt. This was the very thing that was bother~
ing the juror. This i8 \vhy he "'~anted to talk "\Vith the
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judge. 1'hey h1 far·t talked about the 1nerits of the case.
D~fcnrlaTlt \VH.t-;

denied due

ll

rocess

Of lR'\\~.

POI~T

III.
D~FENDA..NT \V,.~S DF.)JlED A FAIR TRIAL I~ THAT
THE TRIAL JL"DGE RECEIVED AN IJt'IPROPER QCESTION
FRQ}f A J LROR A~D TRAl'\Sl\fiTTED THIS E\lPROPER
QIJESTIO~T TO COUNSEL .
..~.-\_s ,,.a~

indiea.ted in the argument to Point

I~

the
trial judge discussed the 1nerits and the la\v of the instant
case \vith a juror in the judge's chambers during the
course of the trial.. See page 6~ This misconduct is
objectlonrrhle in that the~ trial judge latr.r disrlosP.d the
content of t.hls conversation to counsel. Counsel \Vere
thereby })Ut on notice as to the matters ~'hich at least
some of the jurors thought significant.
cour~e

groBs1~·

iinpt·oper for counsel
to ntake an:~ contact ,,~ith tl~<.! jur:.- during the course of
the trial other than t l1a t p rc~eribed by our rules of procedure. lf conn sel ,\~~· rc~ to eon uu un leatc \r i th the jury
or any melnber thereof for ~he pnrpo~e or diseovering
their thinking- in regard to the case, he \\'nnld of rourse
he t;ui1ty or Jnisconrlnr.t and revrrsible error '\Yould have
been committed. This is ~o even if c.ounsel had no thought
of influenc1 nv tlu~ ju r~·, and in f ru·t did not. It \vould
certain 1;.: he· a t.ar..1 i (·nl ad \~a ntage to under~ t and those
rnattrr~ \vhich ,\~ere bothering nten1bers of the jury. r:1 1 his
tactical advantage 'Yhen given to either side. and indeed
'\vhen given to l1nt h~ 1nny vrr)' Vt;"ell operate so as to up~et
the ::;onu."'l luu:s delicate balance upon l\rhi(:h the sueeess
Of

it \vould be

')')
_....,
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of our
justi,·e

udvol~(ltc

Hyste1n depends, and from "\\Thieh our
i~ derived. \Vhen counsPl are provided 'vith an
under~tanding of the 'vorkings of the jnry~s n1ind, the
defendant i~ certainly denied a fair trial ,\·ithin the meaning of onr traditional jdeas of ju~Hcc and fair play. The
del'Pndant ha8 been denied a fair trial a~ pre~el'ihed by
the Con~titution.

The o~('asion ~otueti uteH arises \vhen a juror has a
question to a~ k~ 11 } ~e proper procedure ror handling such
question~ 'vhcn tll(~y occur, flH tl1ey should, in open conrt 1
"\Vas set forth in State. v. ~Iartincz~ 7 Utah ~d 387, B~d
P~ 2d 102 (1958). In that case the tria.l court invited and
encouraged jurors to question vlitnet5se.s even after retirement and even lNitnesses not called at the trial. T'his
Court reversed the deci8ion of the trial court hetau~P.
of this error~ In a concuring opinion Justice "\~\l orlhen
f.! ta ted as f ollo,vs ~
"In my opinion no juror should ever be allo·w·ed to ask questions of the vlitnesses. If a juror
indieates that he haR a. question the court should
invite the juror to disclose to the court the ques~
tion and the court, if the question is 1~ ot yerut an.e
to the i:3sues inrol red or is suclt as 'vould be
clea·rly improper and therefore prej1.ulicial to the
rights of the defe·n.da/ltts to a fair and intpartial
trial should not permit the question to be propounded. If the question is germane to tlte i~sues,
and "\vould not be prejudicial to the rights of the
defendants to a fair and impartial trial, the judge
in tuin should ask the question lrimself.'~ ( Empha·
sis added) .
. .:\. que~t ion hy a jnror direc.ted to c-ounsel concerning
counsel's taetis, or the 'vay he is handJi11g the case is an
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intproper questiou. It is not gcnnane to the issue~
involved and is prejudicial to tltP rights of the defendant.
Such a qu<:~tion t5hould ru.~vPr be allov·.:ed in open court,
for once it is prononneed, if it eannot be anS\\.\'ered consistent \vitl~ tl•e best interests of the defendant, the
dan1age has been done. The jury is left ·with the thought
that ~Joun~el js covering up or Vt ith.holding inforn1ation
from thent. In the i11 stant <~a~e the juror in question
should have been advised by the judge that his question
1\ras improper. The juror should further have lJeen
admonisl1ed not to diHell~8 t}a~ ineident w·itl1 the other
jurors.. l~·athcr the trial judge instru(·ted the juror as
7

follo'\v~:

"I told hin1 that I \vould relate his questions
to conusel, and leave it up to counsel to eitl1er
at<._. rn pt. to re-open their ca~e and }JUt in more
rvide1u~c to elari l'y or take care of the rnatter on
argu1nent..'' (ll. s~)5 and S56) .
.i\.~

far as the juror kne\\. ~ his question V/ould be
transmitted to tounr;e1. 'He was free to djscu~s the entire
1nat.ter 'vith the other jurors once the lnatter 'va.s. submitted. The activity in the instant. case \\'U~ capable of
the ~arne e vii effects in regard to the jury as the activity
\vhiel1 'vas Rtruck dn,vn as reversible error in State v.
1\iartinez, 7 L:tah 2d 387, 826 P. 2d 102 {1958 )~

The hnproper quc~tion in the instant case could
hnve influenced the jury in an unfair and prejud I rial
manner. ,~. . hen the question \\~as related to counsel it
1vas effective to infotm counsel of the thinking of the
jurors. Counsel \vere provided ,\·it h the very sa1ne information they \vould have obt.ained if they had questioned
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the juror personally. The trial judge should have refused
to com1nunicate \vith the juror except in open court.
Hee page 11.. Pursuant to State v.. Martinez, s-upra,
the judge could properly receive the juror's question in
court in order to decide 'vhether or not it v.ras a proper
one.. Since the question in the instant ease involved the
tactics of (•.ounsel, it \\"U~ not ge n n ane to t lLe issues
involved and it Vt as clt. arly pl·ejudicial to the rights of
tl1e defendant The trial judge should have instructed
the juror that hi~ question 'vas improper and could not
be asked. The question never should have reached the
Pars of counsel or the other jurors.
7

Because of the error of the trial judge in allowing
an improper question to be asked by a juror, the defend~
ant has been denied a fair triaL
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTI~G DEFENDANT'S J\.iOTION TO DISMISS AND DEFENDANT~S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SINCE THE JURY

COULD NOT HAVE FOUND BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT
I\'IURDER.

THE

DEFENDAKT

WAS

GUILTY

OF

In Instruction No. 7 the trial judge instructed the
jury as follows:

,. To 1varrant you in convicting the defendant,
the evidence 1nust, to your m.inds, exclude every
reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt
of the defendant.. That is to say, if after an entire
consideration and cornparison of all the testimony
in the case, you can reasonably explain the fact~
given in evidence on a11y reat5onable ground other
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than the guilt of the defendant, you should aquit
him.H (R. 103).

'J1hat t.lli~ i~ a proper instruction in lJtah eannot be
doubted. ln ~tate v . L·aub, 102 l~tah 40~, 131 P.2d
805 ( 1942) , this Court stated as follows :
~·..

the p ro~r~eu iion still 1ta~ the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. Or stated another \vay, the
proseeution 1nust 'not only sho'v
that the
alleged facts and ti rtu n 1~tail(·(~~ arc t ruP, but they
a1a:::;t all-30 be sueh f'a('1 ~ and eireu1nsta11ces that
are irt<'Olnpatible upon any reasonable hypothesis,
Vt'i th the innocence of the aceused, and incapable
of explanation upon any reasonable hypothesis
other than the dcfenda 111 \ gu i 11:. ~ .. all the cireum81.anePs as proved mu~t be consistent v.rith each
other~ and they are to be taken together as proved .
Being consistent ''"it l1 eael1 other and taken together thl~Y Jnust point ~urcly and unerringly in
tl1e direeti011 Of guilt~'
I

•

I

••

if tv.r'o reasonable hypothesis are
pointed out b.\· the evidence and one of t h en1 points
to t.hp dcfendan 1.~s iun<"w0.nee~ it \\·ould then he
diffie.nlt to see hovl any jury could be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant':-)
'Hence~

gui1t.'~

Sr~c~

a1so Statt~ v ..A..nderf.;on~ 108 1Ttal1 1~~0, 1 ~S P. 2d 1:27

( 1D45) ; State v ~ Burch, 100

l.~ tn lt

-! 1-!, 115 PI ~d 911
(1941) ; State v~ C ra1vford, 59 l~! nh 39~ ~01 Pac. 1(1:"$0
( l D~ 1) ; P(\op 1P v. Sr. nt 1, 10 1~ t ah 217, 3 7 P a c~ :-~; L) ( 18 94) ;
State v~ l~~r-w in, 101 l. ·tah ;~();), l ~U P~ ~d ~SS, ;·~o~ (1941)..
If the evidence indicate~ a reasonable ltypothesis
as to innocence, the case should not ht.~ allo,vcd to go to
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the jur~r. l f the facts relied on by the State are not
inconsist(lJI t \Yith defendant\.; innocence, the innocence of
the dP 1\jnuant is established aR a 1natte1· of la"\v. See
~tau~ v. Anderson, supra; State v . l 4 ~r,vin, supra .

The State relied on the faet that Rivenburgh before
entering the attic disclos(~d a plan to k 111 the decedent
The decedent \\·n~ killed in the att ie. a1Hl the defendant
\\-nH there at the tinlC ol' the killing.
Sorne of the State's \vitnesses 1vere present at the
ti1ne Rivenburgh revealed his alleged plan, but none of
them believed Rivenburgh "\Vas serious ( R. -±48). The
defendant 1vas not even present at the time. lie \Vas in
another cell v,;rith the inmnte Dripps (R· . 41G, 417 and
447). Neither the defendant nor Dripps heard the discussion of the alleged plan (R. 447) .
The first knowledge that defendant gajned of the
killing 1vas 'vhen the tnatter 1va~ di~eusscd in a card
game after the killing {R.. 513 and ~) 14) ~ ·rherc see1ns
to be a dispute a~ to \\··hethcr or not there \va~ a card
g-tllllC before the killing as \Y{_~n. rrl~{_~ ininate Stark testified that there \\··a8 ~uch a card game (R. 786, 787 and
7D2). At that card game there ,,~as no conversation concerning a plan to kill the decedent (R. 79;{). Stark
'vas present during all of the time defendant 'vas at
the rard ga1ne and no plan to kill the decedent \vas
mentioned (R . 794).

Tho State argued that the defendant kne'" of the
plan for the following reasons: (1) lie \vas in the next
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ecll \vhen the plan 1vas dit5eu~sed, so he could have been
able to hear it. 8o \Vas Dripps, ho"'~cver, l1e did not hear
the (~onvcrsation.. (_~) The plan \ras discussed at a r..ard
game ,,-hich \vas allegedly before the killing (R. 535), as
\v~ll as again at another ca.rd ga1ne after the killing '\vhile
alibis \Vt"~re being di~cussed. Ho\\~{_~ver, Stark ~'as present
at both card games and he heard nothing of a plan to
kill rmtil during the card gan1e held after the killing
(lt. "794). ( 3) In defendant~s "\Vritten statement ''Thich
\Vas taken at .J ;00 a.n1. on Auerust 29, 1958, five days
after the ki l_lj ng, the defendant 8aid he l1eard of Rivenburgh's plan to kill the decedent H'vl1cn all of us \vas up
there pla~y ing cards"" ; that he thought he 'vas joking
at first; that Rivenburgh sent him for a knife; '\\'hen
asked hy tlH~ defendant \V l1 }' he killed the decedent, Rivenburgh anS,\··ered that the dcfendanfs rca~on~ \vere Rivenburgh·~s rL~rt~on ~ (R. 51.4) .
The only card game that "\Vas played ''when all of
us \Vas up thcrcH (R.ivenburglt, Dalton, Stark~ and the
defendant} \vas a,/tf!r the killing. Certainly this ,,-as the
only (~ard game \vherc ltivcn l1nrgh "\\'as present..

After the killing but five days before the defendant\='
~taterncnt, the defendant l1ad been pre:-:1ent "\Yhen there
"\Vere conversations involving Rivenburgh and other inmates relative to the alleged planr '"hat in fact did
l~nppen~ and !ltan)' pnssible alibis. Defendant's statement
is merely 'vha t. he believed to be the facts of the incident.
Attention muHt be dirr.(·ted to the fact that the
defendant \\·as but sixteen yt~a r~ of age and had an
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emotional age of three or four years. Certainly he had
not led the life of the average boy before hi~ incarceration in the l;tah. State Pri~on. He had fear instilled in
hi1n the day he entered the prison4 He "\vas used and
and abu8ed in homosexual activities, was sold, .E,Tj_ven and
discarded an1ong other in1nates, and "\\-a~ indoctrinated
early that he ''{as to do \vhat others told him to do~

lie was a\vakened at approximately 3:30 a.nl~ out of
a sound sleep, advised that J~o\vne had given a statement1
advised by the investigating tcan1 that they felt Rivenburgh vla.s really the guilty one that the defendant and
Bo,vne 'vere ''patsies/' advised that it 'vould be "better
for 1rim to give a statement,,~ that it 'vas ~'real irnportant
that he tell,'' that he v,.could be sent to the Salt Lake
County Jail if he gave the statement (R~ 512-521). In
vie\v of the defendant's mental condition, his age, and the
advice given to him, it i~ little v.ronder that his s ta tern en t
is less than clear as to the sequence of P.vents.
It is rea~onable to believe that the defendant thought
Rivenburgh 'vas going to the attic to con1mit sodomy
and not to kill because of the follo~'ing facts:
1. Defendant kne\v ot no plan to kill bcforo the killing (R. 513 and 3 14).
2~

Rivenburgh told Dalton after the killing that it
'vas in the attic that he fjrst intended to and did
kill the decedent. This '"as ber.ause the d ec.eden t
Vlas going to tell about the sodomy ( li. 381),
and berause he v.lould not perform the sodomy
in a particular manner ( R.. i)S7).
29
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34 ~·one of the State\~ \vitnesses thought Rivenburgh 1va~ going to kill tlt(~ decedent, e.g.~
(a.) Xeither Stark nor Dalton thought the deeedent \vould be killed in spite of tlle fact that

tl1cy ~n \V l~ivenburgh and tlH.: decedent go
lo the attic.

(b) Riven burgh asked Dripps to stand point for
sodomy (lL 340).
(c) Rivenburgh told ])alton that he 1-vas going
to take the deccdC11t to the attic for sodomy
(R~ 380 and 381).
{d) Bov~7Jle told Ran de 1 that he and the defendant
Vt'ent to the attic tu stand point for sodomy

(R. 4·78).

4. IJuring none of the n1any conver8ations~ (1id the
defendant tell anyone that he had kno\vn of u
plan to kill before the killing (R4 349~ 350, 373:i"77, 3S5, -tOS-41:3, 460 and 461).
5. 1t. 'vas comn1on at the prison to hca r of plans to
kill others.

6. It v.ras eonnnon to stand point for sodo1ny in the
a ttie and else,~lherc ( R. 388).
7. It 'vas c.ommon to carry knives in the prison (R.
~)~0)
• ) .... .;:1 ..

S. It \vas common to practice sodon1y at the prison
{R.. 389) ~
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D~

rrh~

I

use () r Ainphetainine pills \\'a~ eonunon at

the P ri ~orL

..:\ t

{) ::~o

1).111.~

Rivenburgh \va.::; high
on J' in~, arl d he· (n l k( ~( 1 about killing the drtc·df~ll t
:\ o one thought hint ~t~ t·iou~ beeanse of previous
plans, threats, and ~~big talk', induc.ed by the

pill~~

10. Other inmates \vho 1vere 'vitne~.'3e~ for the State
and \\·ho kne\V o l" Rivenburgh~s .uplan," stood
point, destroyed cvldenc(~ and joined in alibi~;
yet they 'vere c.harged \\·lth nothing.. They could
not receive innnunity for turning ~tate~s evidence~
Im1nunity can only be afforded a defc~tdant and
that. requires court approval. l~tah (~ode Ann~ §
77-31-7 ( 1953). The reason they \\'~-' n: not eharged
along 'vi th the defendant, as a~3erted lJ_y· the
prosecuting at.tornPy~s office, "~as because they
had no intent or kno,vledge that the decedent v{as
going to be killed. ~Phc reason they had no intent
\\'HS becau~e tlLry did not think R.i"venhnrgh \vas
seriont5. The defendant did not even kno'v of his
plan.
Even if it is reasonable to believe that a plan '.Ya~
effected, it is a so rea~onable to believe that the defendant 1vas in the attic to stand point for sodon1y~ Even if
the facts relied on hy the Statf~ are consistent 'vith the
defendanVs g-nilt, thPy do not. . ~~ .. exclude evP.ry reasonable hy_pot hesi:::. other than the exi~tenee of sur.h fact.. ... ''
~tntP v. ~-\ nderson, lOS ltah 1:30, 1;)s P. 2d 12·7 ( 1~)45).
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POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFGSING TO GIVE
DEFEKDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 43+
Defenda.nt~s

requested instruction :\ o. -l~~ deals v.rith
the jury's right to recommend jrnprisonment at hard
labor for lire in tl1e event of a verdir.t of murder in the
first degree. lt reads in part as follows:
~' . . ~

you are instructed that \VhPther von
rnake such a recon1menda tion is en tire I y Vli thin
your di.~eretion to be exercised in any manner and
for an).. reason you see fit.. You are not to be
influenced or intimidated by the Court in this
absolute right of yours a~ j u ro r·s." ( R. 95).
The law in l;tah in this area is stated in State v.
Thorne, D6 l~t.ah 208, 117 Pac. :JS (1911). See also, State
v. _\Iarkham, 100 TJtah 22G, 112 P. 2d 49G (1941). This
case clear l !' i nd i(~ate~ that the recommendation is within
the ~o]e discretion of the jury. If the jury is led te think
that their rceorurncndation must be justified, then there
.
1s error .
In the instant (·ase tl1e trial court instructed the
jury as follo\vs: ~-J..>rejudie(\ passion and syn1pathetic
feelings l1ave no pla.e-e "\vhatsoPv0.r in your rlel ibcrations.
\ . . on should disregard all bias, prejudice, and other extraneous influences.'~ (R . 103). In regards to the recomrnendat1 on, tl1e trial court instructed t l1e jury· as f ollo\vs :
''you are in8tructed to give it your careful and conscientious considers tion. ~· (R. 11 5).
In viev-.T of the instructions thP trial court did give,
1vhich are noted above~ the defendant was prejudiced
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refusal to give his reque~ted inHtruction
No. 43. rrhe jury "\Vas told that S)~pathetic feelings hnd
no plaee in their deliberations. They vlere further told
to con~ider their recotntnendation carefullyr They 'vere
itnpt·<.~~~ed b_y t lle fact that their recon1mendation, if
made, \\Ta~ to be justified in sonle \VflY and not the product
of tnere .... SJTilpathetic feelings' 1 or '~pa~sion''. This is
<.~ontrary to the la\V as stated in State v. rrhorne, supra.
The defendant's requested instruction X o4 43 \Yould have
cured thi.'S di lTiculty. The trial court erred in refusing to
give it.

by the

<'O r·ut~:-3

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NOr 20 IS CONFUSING AND l)l ERROR BECAUSE IT FAILS TO SEPAR-

ATE THE CRIME OF SODOMY FROM THE

CRIME

OF

)lURDERt AND IN I'TS ABSTRA~CT FORIVI COULD ALLOW
Tll~ JURY TO FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF MURDER IF THEY BELIEVED HE AIDED AND ABETTED IN
THE ACT OF SODOMY ..

Instruction No. 20 is the trial court's instruction
on ""aiding and abetting'' (R. 118 and 119). It \vould not
be objeetiona ble if it \Vere not for the far.t that in the
instant case more than one crime \vas involved. l.fueh of
the testimony in trod need involved the ('l' i tne of sodo1ny
(See e.g. It 409, 460 478J 716 and 7BS) rfhc cri IllC of
sodomy \va~ defined in the court:t~ instruction X o4 16
(R. 114).. Sodoaly \vas inextricably conneeted 'vith the
fact situation4 Sodon~~r, the criu1c against nature, i~
capable of engendering deep seated prejudices against
anyone connected \Vith lt.. Indeed it must have been difficult for the jur)~ in the instant case to appreciate the
4
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fact that n one 'vas being proseeuted for t111i:l aet of
perversion. ln vie\V of this, it 1va8 error for the court
to instruct a.s in Instruction No . 20 .

In Instruction No. 20 ~ the court fails to specify
\Vhiel1 er"tme it is ~peaking of. The Instruction reads in
part as follo\vs:
~~\~on

are inst.ru(~tcd that one \vho keeps "\\'"atch
'vhere a c-rin-te is being perpPtrated, so a~ to faciliital.e the <._.. seape of one actuall~r eo1nmitting it,
or to prevent his being interrupted, if the said
keeping \vatch j~ puri:Juant to a common design to
eornurit the crhne, said per8on keeping watch, is
aiding and abetting, and is a principal.~' (Emphasit5 added . ) (R. 119) ~
"\'\Then read in the context of the evidenr..e, the court
literall~l seetns to tell tl1e jury· that if the defendant 'vas
toncerned in the cornl ni6t:Jion of ''a crime'~ (the crime of
souon1y perhaps), then he is a principal in ~'any crime~'
(the crime of tnurder included).
rrhe defendant \Vas ella rged only -with murder~ It
'va~

err()J" not to specify \vhieh crime tl1e jury V{BS to
consider.. 'l,he defendant admitted tJis part in the crime
of ~odom)'~ This, in fact, \\Ta~ his defense to the crime
of 1nur·dcr. Yet in Instrutcion ~T D~ 20, the trial judge
failed to Rpecify 'vhiclt crime thP aiding and abetting of
vlould render the defendant guilty. The ;jury~ ,,~bile still
under the irnpact of a sordid story of sexual perversion,
'va~ free to consider tlte defendant H part in the sexual
.activities as acts capable of rendering him guilty on the
charge of murder.. If the jur~~ cllose to follo"T this instruction~ the fact tl1a t the d~ ~ fendan t stood point (look~
1
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out) for an art of sodo1ny \Vas sufficient to rnake him a
principal in the crirne of murder.

This Court ha~ expres~ed itself on many occasions
in regard to the use of abstract instructions. See State
v . Tho1npson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P. 2d 15:·; (1946), and
cases cited therein. Instruction No. 20 is needlessly ab~
stract in failing to substitute the tenn "rnurder'' for the
general ter·n1 "c.rime". In vie"\v of the peculiar facts of
this case, the shocking and highly distasteful facts involving sodomy, the failure of the trial court to indi<·nte that
it was the aiding and abetting of murder and only murder which \vould tnake the defendant a pr1nelpal in the
crime charged "\vas greatly prejudiciaL
The prejudicial nature of this instruction \vas not
cured by a correct staternent or the la\v elseo,vhere ln
the in~tructions~ See Soda v ...:\-1 arriot, 118 Cal. App.
635, G P. 2d 675, 677 ( 1931). rr his rule is especially true
in a criutinal case 'vhere the crime charged iH punishable
by death.. 'rhe trial judge in his instructions should take
special care to remove any material whicl• is erronons
or unnecessarily abstract and thus prej udi (•.lal to the
defendant.
POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO~ 17.

Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 17 reads as
follo,vs:
"You are instructed that where the direct
evidence is conflicting as to 'vhether the defendant
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J es~e "\f. 0 are.ia, .Jr. killed Leroy J usc ph 1lerner
and \vhcLre eitlu~r part or all of the evidence is
eirelllllS Lan tial evidenee, t 1~ c~ defendant's 1notvie to
do t lH~ acts in quet5tion or his absence of ntotive
should be considered by you as strong evidence
of the guilt or innocence of the aceuscd. 'fhe ahRenr~t· oi" a n1otive on the part of the defendant
Jesse ).f. ( j arcia, Jr. to kill T e 1· oy J o s e ph \~ern t~ r
sj rc11gthcns the pre:-.;urnpl.ion of defendanfs jnnocence and 1nay raise a reasonable doubt as to
his guilt.'' ( R. 68).
J

The trial judge refused to give this ins tructiu n to the
jury (R. GS )~
No n1otive \Vas as~rrted or shov~rn a~ far n~ the
defendant 1vas concerned. The absence of any proof as
to n1otive tends to indicate innocence. See People v.
Tom '\V'oo, lSl Calif~ ;~15, 1~-1: Pac. 3S9 ( 1919) \\"here
reliance is plac·ed entirely on circumstantial evidence to
establish a cri1ne, absence of 1notivc is a circumstance
tending to clear the accused. See Slater \. State~ .2~4
Ind. f.t27, 70 N.E~ 2d 425 ( 1947). "\~'lhile the presence or
absence of motive is not proof of a substantive fact~ its
absence ~t1·engthens the presnn1ption of innocence~ See
Thornas v. (~nnnn., 1S7 \r:=t. 265, 4G S.E. 2d ;~SS (1948 )~
r

DcfcndarJt \vas entltlcd to l1ave 1:hc

jur~- con~ider

the
an~y- prof as to n1otive, and tlu? trial judge

ahsencP. or
erred in not submitting defendant's Requested Instruetion No. 17 to the jury~
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POINT VIII..
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I)l" REFCSING TO GIVE
D!·~F~NDA~T'S REQ"CBSTED INSTRUCTIO~S NO. 19 AND
NO. 21.

DefendaJl t ,~ J{~·q_lu~~ted I n~truction X o~ 19 readH as

f•)llO\\'H:

"\- ou are instructed that if ~you find from
all o [' t.he evidence in the case that the dei'enrlant,
J l•Hsc ~L {J arit·u~ .Jr. [sic] vlas in the attic n t the
t i In(_~ I_jero y Joseph '_.r erner 1vas killed for the purpose or ~tanding point "Thile an act of ~odo1ny
\,·as ernnmi tted and that Leroy J o~e ph \ erner
\V8H killed a.s a result of an independent art and
intention on the part of the defendant, ~lark
~lerril Rivenburgh, ·you must find the defendant,
~ J essie ~I. Garcia, tT r. ~ 'Not Guilty.' n
( R. 70)
T

r

Defendane~

Requested l.nstruc:.tion Xo. :!1 has the same
~ignificance except that the addnd factor of a fight
in the attic "\vas dealt ·w·i th, and the jur·y was asked to
consider the defendant "s intent jn regards to s nrh a fight.
See~ R . 72.
These instructions in substance contained defendant's
defense. .He \Vent to the attic. jn compljance with an
order fro1n a person he greatly feared to function as a
lookout during an act of pervcr~ion~ He did not intend
to kill, or to do great bodil~v hat·nl to the decedent or
anyone elt:e. He \\"tt6 not a1vare of any p'an 01· irdent on
behalf of the inrnate J{ivcnbu rgh~ l l~ the ju1·y thought
it reasonable to believe the defendant_t then cef·t.ainly
lu:~ 'vas not guilty of tnurdcr in the fir~t degree.

Defendant had a right to have the jury instructed
as in his Requested Instructions No . 19 and No. 21. See
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State v. E.vans, 7-l l!tah 389, 3D6, .279 Pac. 950 (1929). It
'".-as prejudicial to hirn not to have his t}Jcory of defense
be I'0 n_~ the j U I' y ~ rr h j H is e spe cia11 y S 0 in V j e\V 0 f the
instruction the court did give .in the form of Instruction
No. 20 ( R-.. 118 and 119). Sec page 33.
POINT IX.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REF"LSING TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IKSTRL.-;CTION NO. 20,

Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 20 reads as
follO\VS:
'~ lf

after a consideration of the evidence you
conclude that it is rea~onable to believe that the
defendant J est:1e )f. Ga.rria, J r4 intended to commit
rnurdcr ar1d also rcaf.:onahle to believe that he
intended to stand point for sodo1ny~ you have
no d11ty to detern1ine 1vhich of the hvo is rnore
reasonable but should find the defendant "1\ot
Guilty~~. ( R~ 71)
4

This instruction injeets the defendant~s theory of defense
into the reasonable h)iJOthesis rule4

It is 1Nell settled that the reasonable hypothesis
rule jg the la\v of Utah. See page 26. The trial court
instructed the jury as to thls rule in the courfs Instrurtion i\o~ 7 ( R. 103) ~ This instruct] on 'vas ho,vever abstract in nature and dj ffjcult for the jury to understand.
DefPndan t's Requested Instrur.t.ion ~To. 20 n ~ l~ re l.Y inserted
the names and alternate theories into the abstract instruction.
Abstract in::!tructions should be avoided. See State
v. Thon1pson ~ 110 LT t al1 113, 170 P. 2d 153 ( 1946), and
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cases cited therein. j)ef(~lJdant'~ Requested Instruction
:\'o . ~0 1nerely helped to get the defendant's theory of
defcn~t-- before the jury \vithin the tneaning of the reasonable hypothesis rule . Certainly the defendant ,,-a~ entitled
to hu ve his defense before the jury. Sec page 37.
Certainly the reasonable hypothesis theory~~ n1ore mean1ngfnl to a jury~ 'vhen it is stated in tern1~ of the evidence .

The trial judge erred in not Hubtnit t ing defendantts
requested instruction No. 20 to the jury, and the defendand was prejudiced thereby .

POINT X .
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO COMPEL
THE PROSECUTION TO FURNISH TAPE RECORDINGS
AND COPIES OF STATEMENTS MADE BY WITNESSES
AND THE DEFENDANT.

The Prosecution was permitted, while exannnJng
witnesses and the defendant at trial, to refer to notes,
contents of tape recording~ and statements taken during
the State's investigation of the facts.
rl,he full contents of such documents should h..1.Ve

been afforded counsel for the defendant as argued in his
~lotion to Produce Documents (R. 16 and 17) The prosecution had the unfair advantage of quoting 'vords out
of con text. This jeopariliz ed .counsel for the def en dan t
in his cross-examination and re-direct. Quoting Vrlords
out oF context is especially unfair and prejudicial 1n the
instant ease because of the great amount of circumstantial
evidence.
r

39
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In his (·ros~-exa1ninaiion, the pro~ecution \vas in a
position to impress the jury that ever.ything he stated
\vas (~ontained in the notes, tape reeording or statetnents,
when in f.act it mighi. never havfl been. J~ecause the
\vitnc\~~ eould not remember everything that \va::; said at a
definite ti tne and plaee rnany montl1s prior to trial)' it
"\vas implied that he vlas falsely testifying. This coul.-l
l1ave been cured by ref re~ l1ing the 'vitness's memory on
rc-djrcet~ "\\Tithout the proper doc.uments, support "\Vas
i rn poss1b1 e.
.t\n unfair and prejudicial advantage \vas afforded
t.hc pl'O~f~en tion by the error committed by the trial court
in failing to e.ompel the production of documents as
rcqur~stcd in defendant's motion.
POINT XI.
THE TRIAL
A KEW TRIAL.

COL~RT

ERRED IN

REFUSI~G

TO GRANT

_..:\. ne\r trial should have hPOTl g"ranted for the reasons
(' j ted in de f enrlan rs 1no ~ ion ( lt. 182 and 133). llere it
1vas specifically brought to thf~ conrt~s attention that
the defendant '\Yas not pre~ent during al1 stages of the
proceedings. See page 18. The improper communication \v.ith the jury was also relied upon. See page 6.
Derendant.''s motion for a ne1-v trial also indicated
thal. the jury \vas separated during its deliberations. Tl1is
'\vas ocea~ion~d 1vhen tl1e bailiff took six jurors at a time
do,vn an P 1evrd or for purpose of going to the re::!t room .

For the reasons set f ortl1 in defendant's 1Iotion For
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New Trial (R . 132 and 133), especially those noted above
whit·ll \Vel'(_~ argued in detail in connection 'vith the arguInents to Point I and Point II, the trial judge erred in
not granting a new trial.
POINT XII.
THE TRIAL COCRT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT,S :\IOTION TO STRIKE TES'TI:\'10~1:T W IIICH WAS
ADMITTED ON 'THE STATEjS REPRESENTATION THAT
IT WOULD SHOW A CONSPIRACY TO COM]rilT MURDER ..

1\ great deal of te ~ tilno ny prejudic.ial to the de-

fendant ''.ras adtnitted during the trial on the State'~
repreHentation that it 'vould show a conspiracy to conlInit Inurder on the defendantts part . Illustrative of
this was the testimony of ''Tilliam Randel, an .J n1na te
\\=-ho testified for the State as to a certain conversation
bet\veen himself and Rivenburgh prior to the killing.
Randel stated that the defendant "\Vas not present during
the conversation. The conversation 1\Tas objected to as
hearsa~y and a motion to strike was n1ade. This was
denied (R. 418). The objection was raiRed again, and
the State explained the testimony as ''the start of a
conspiracy." (R. 419 and 420).
The State presented a great deal of testhnony \vhich
\ras hearsay as to the defendant because he was not
present. T'ltis testirnony dealt ''rith conversations bet,vecn Rivenburgh and other~ and Bo1\7De and others.
The testimony served to impress the jury with the
fact that there w a~ some kind of a plan to kill After
the State's case, the defendant once more moved to
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strike on the grounds that the State had failed to tie
the defendant to the so called conspirary (R. 530).
The record is rather confut:Jjng as to the court's
l'uling on tl~i~ motion and it rnay be that tl~e court
ne·ver, in fact, made a ruling. lf the courf~ action or
laek of action is construed as a denial, then jt erred
in den)"· i ng the rnotion. The on 1y evldener. \v hj e h the
State eonld point to that \\·ould serve to connc~(·i. the
defend ant to any kind of COil spiracy v.,:ras con i-ainerl in
the defendant' f.; state1nent {R. 5~36) This statement dealt
\Vi tl1 a conversation \Vhieh 'vas had during a card game.
The evidence is clear that the card game \Vas had after
the killing. This point i~ covered in detail in the argument to Point TIT. See page 23.
r

]~he StatL~ failed

to tie to the defendant the evidence introduced \\·hich tended to shov~r a conspiraC)'.
rrlll~ l.rjal COUl't erred in not striking this tP.stimony from
~he record.
POINT XIII.

THB TRIAL COl:RT ERRED T~ SUBl\fiTTING THE
CASE TO THE JURY ON THE QUESTION OF MURDER
I~ THF. FIRST DEGREE SINCE AS A MATTER OF LAW,
DEFEKDANT'S )-!ENTAL COKDITlON PREVENTED HI:\1
FROD.-1 PREJ\IEDITATING OR 11ELIBERATI~G.

·rhe test r1nnny intr()duced relative to the defendant's
mental condition 1\·a~ somP\\·l~at c·njl fut:Jing. Dr~ CJarenr.e
Craig 1\ elsun tc·~tified that j n his opinion, under the
ei n~u u n.; tnru·(~~ of tl1 is 1nciden t, the defendant \ras unable
to premeditate and deli l ,era te upon the killing (It 43S
and 459) ~ Dr~ Nelson i~ a P-~;T{~hiatrist \vho 1vas ern-
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ployPd by the Htate for a nuu•ber of years (R-. 593, 594

and 596). 1i e had an o p portu11 i ty, by virtue of his emplo~nnent., to observe and cxantine the defendant on
~t~veral oe("a~lonH over a long period of ti1ne~ (I·t 59;3GOG)4 Dr4 Lincoln D. ·Clark and Dr. Richard lver~on
testified as witnesses for the State (R. 797 and 812 ).
In substance, Dr. Clark's opinion 'vas contrary to that
of Dr. Nelson':-:; although the only examination 'vhi{!h Dr.
Clark n1ade of the defendant \vas made during the
action for the purpose of testifying at the trial (R. 811).
Dr. Iverson did not give an opinion as to the defendant's
ability to pretncditat.e or deliberate the c.rJ.me charged.

The

la\\~

in Utah re1ative to di1ninishing and partial
responsibilit}· is set forth in State v4 Green, 78 Vtah
580~ 6 P.2d 177 ( 1931). It is clear that if the defendant
is affected ''{it h a 1nen tal di s8a se "rhieh p rev ents hin1
fron1 deliberating or premeditating, then the jury cannot find hjrn guilty of rnurder in the first degree~ See
also, 'Vashington V~ State, 165 X eb~ 275, 85 X.\V. ld
509 ( 1957) ; State v. Franco, 347 P.2d 312 (N.~1. 1959);
cf., State V~ _A_nselnl o, -+6 lJ tah 137, 148 Pac. 1071 ( 1915).
ln the instant case~ the testimon}' presents a conflict of Px pert witnes~e~. Certainly the jury· could not
find hPyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant \vas
capable of premeditating and deliberating. If the experts
the·nlselves could not agree af.; to the mental ability of
the defendant, it is doubtful that laymen, 'vho kno"\v
nothing at all about psychiatry could be in perfect
agreement. The court erred in submitt.ing this question
to the jury. As a 1natter of law there is reasonable doubt.
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(~(JXCLl1 Sl()X

The defendant has been denied the due process of
la\v- 1vhich i~ guaranteed by our (:onstitut!ons. lie has
been (lcprived of a fair trial 1Jcfore an in1partial jury.
The evidence in this caf.;e did not \va.rrant submission
to the juiJ"" on the question of }Iurder in the First
Degrect and the defendant't:1 eonvicti on of such charge
is not substantiated by the evidence. ~rhe trial and
verdict eonstitute a rniscarriage of jui-;t]ee and should
be reversed.

Respectfull :,-~ submitted,
Jl.i\ N~E~ AND MILLF~It
Counsel for Appellant
410 ~Jmpire Building

Salt Lake City, r.;tah
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